Constitutional Law—Supreme Court Invalidates Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). by Scott, John M.
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 3 Article 6 
1996 
Constitutional Law—Supreme Court Invalidates Federal Gun-Free 
School Zones Act. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
John M. Scott 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John M. Scott, Constitutional Law—Supreme Court Invalidates Federal Gun-Free School Zones Act. United 
States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)., 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 513 (1996). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss3/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUPREME COURT INVALIDATES FEDERAL
GUN-FREE SCHOOL ZONES ACT. UNITED STATES v. LOPEZ, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Lopez,1 the United States Supreme Court ruled
unconstitutional Congress's enactment of the Gun-Free School Zones Act of
19902 because Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause3
of the United States Constitution.4 This decision reversed the Court's trend
granting Congress very broad Commerce Clause power. The Court
concluded that possession of a firearm in a school zone did not constitute
an interstate commerce activity,5 nor did the Act provide for a jurisdictional
element that would guarantee an interstate economic effect.6
This casenote begins with a concise description of Lopez's facts in Part
II. Part III will review the case's background and will track the evolution
of the commerce power leading up to Lopez. In Part IV, the note will
analyze the reasoning of the Court and will present a brief look at the
concurring and dissenting opinions. Part V addresses the legal significance
and post-decision ramifications of Lopez.
II. FACTS
On March 10, 1992, Alfonso Lopez, Jr., respondent in Lopez, was six
weeks away from his graduation at San Antonio Edison High School.
7
Lopez arrived at school that day concealing an unloaded .38 caliber handgun
and five bullets.8  School authorities received an anonymous tip and
confronted Lopez.9 Upon confrontation, he admitted he was carrying a gun,
was arrested, and was charged with firearm possession on school premises
under Texas state law.'0
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624(1995).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
5. The Court, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), defined commerce
among the states as commerce concerning more than one state. Id. at 194. Consistent with
Gibbons, throughout this note, the term "interstate commerce" will be used to refer to
commercial activities among more than one state. The term "intrastate commerce" will refer
to commercial transactions that occur entirely within one state.
6. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
7. Kevin Fedarko, A Gun Ban is Shot Down, TIME, May 8, 1995, at 85.
8. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), af'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624,
1626 (1995).
9. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
10. Id. Gun possession violated TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.03(a)(1) (West Supp.
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Carrying a gun to school violated both state law and the federal Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990 ("the Act"), which created a federal offense
for carrying a firearm within one thousand feet of a school." Federal agents
charged Lopez with violating the Act, and the state charges were
dismissed. 2
A federal grand jury indicted Lopez for violating the Act. 3 Lopez
moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming the Act was unconstitutional
because Congress had exceeded its power to control public schools.
14
Denying this motion, the district court found the Act within Congress's
power to exert control over interstate commerce activities. 5 Subsequently,
Lopez waived his right to a jury trial, and the court found him guilty of
violating the Act, sentencing him to six months imprisonment and two years
supervised release.' 6
On appeal, Lopez argued that by passing the Act, Congress had
exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. 7 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction, 8 holding the Act
an invalid exercise of Congress's commerce power' 9 and stating that neither
the Act nor its legislative history established whether school zone gun
possession affects interstate commerce.
20
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari2' and affirmed the
Fifth Circuit's decision 2 after concluding that possessing a gun in a school
zone did not constitute an interstate economic activity.23 Conceding that
1994). Lopez admitted he was delivering the gun for forty dollars and that it was to be used
in a "gang war." Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A). The statute makes it a federal crime to "possess a
firearm [knowingly] at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe,
is a school zone." Id. The term "school zone" is defined as "in, or on the grounds of a...
school" or "within a distance of 1,000 feet from the grounds of a . . . school." Id.
§ 921(a)(25).
12. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief to Petition for Certiorari).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995).
19. Id. at 1367-68.
20. Id. at 1366. The Fifth Circuit stated "we merely hold that Congress has not done
what is necessary to locate section 922(q) within the Commerce Clause." Id. at 1368. The
Court further stated that a conviction under the Act conceivably could be sustained if "the
government alleged and proved that the offense had a nexus to commerce." Id.
21. United States v. Lopez, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994).
22. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995).
23. Id.
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prior Commerce Clause cases left room for expansion of Congress's powers,
the Court declined to enlarge the scope of legislative control.24
III. BACKGROUND
Supreme Court interpretation of the Commerce Clause has evolved over
the past 175 years. This Background section will peer chronologically into
the Court's ever changing Commerce Clause theories, fitting the important
cases into their respective social, political, and economic time frames.
A. Enactment of the Commerce Clause
Enacted in response to the Articles of Confederation,25 the Commerce
Clause empowers Congress to regulate commerce with foreign countries,
between states, and with Indian Tribes.2 6 Because the Commerce Clause
possessed little legislative history regarding the regulation of commerce
among the states, the early Supreme Court had to reflect upon the historical
context from which it arose.27 The Commerce Clause addressed two b~road
concerns by creating: (1) a power capable of ending existing trade barriers,
and (2) a federal authority expansive enough to address the nation's
problems as a whole.28
Promulgated to balance the power between the federal government and
the states,29 the Tenth Amendment states that powers not granted explicitly
to the federal government by the Constitution vest in the states.30 This
structural division of authority between the states and the federal govern-
ment, federalism, 3' has been the fulcrum upon which many Commerce
24. Id.
25. The Articles of Confederation gave Congress no authority over commerce between
the states. RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE § 4.3, at 264 (1986). This absence of centralized federal control under the
Articles of Confederation led to "economic chaos" among the states, with individual states
establishing trade barriers. These barriers amounted to economic warfare and included
economic sanctions against other states' products and taxes on trade coming into their state.
Id.
26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 3 ("Congress shall have the power to . . . regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.").
27. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 25, at 265.
28. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 25, at 265-66.
29. Vincent A. Cirillo & Jay W. Eisenhofer, Reflections on the Congressional
Commerce Power, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 901, 903 (1987).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.").
31. Federalism "includes interrelationships among the states and relationships between
1996]
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Clause cases have teetered. The central theme of the Tenth Amendment
and, in turn, federalism, is that Congress's powers are enumerated.32 This
concept results in a dichotomy-for a Congressional act to be valid, the
Constitution must explicitly authorize that act; conversely, a state's act is
presumed valid unless expressly forbidden by the Constitution.33
B. Early Interpretation
Chief Justice Marshall penned the first significant Commerce Clause
opinion, Gibbons v. Ogden.34 Although Gibbons could have turned on
whether the case involved interstate commerce and whether New York was
authorized to grant a monopoly for water rights,35 the Court exceeded these
specific issues" to hold that a state may not grant exclusive navigation
rights conflicting with interstate commerce.37
The Court addressed three foundational Commerce Clause concerns.38
First, the Court defined commerce as "all commercial intercourse. 39
Second, the Court clarified what constitutes commerce among the states,
stating that it was commerce concerning more than one state.4' Third, the
Court clarified the effect of the Tenth Amendment on federal power, not as
a restriction on federal power, but as it related to Congress's enumerated
powers." The Court stated that, when acting under its enumerated powers,
Congress deserved a plenary power to regulate, limited only by the
Constitution.42
the states and the federal government." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990).
32. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-2, at 298 (2d ed. 1988).
33. Id.
34. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
35. In Gibbons, New York had given the exclusive privilege to navigate its waters to
the assignors of Ogden. Id. at 2. Ogden sought an injunction against Gibbons to prevent
him from operating his steam boats between Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and New York City.
Id. Gibbons defended his right to traverse New York waters based upon a federal license
for engaging in "coasting trade." Id.
36. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 133 (1987). Justice Felix
Frankfurter, an ardent Chief Justice John Marshall devotee, described Chief Justice Marshall's
Gibbons opinion as "either consciously or calculatedly confused." Id. n.64 (citing FELIX
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 17 (1937)).
37. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 221.
38. Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 29, at 909 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 186-222).
39. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193.
40. Id. at 194. The Court stated, however, that congressional commerce power does not
extend to commerce conducted exclusively within one state, as "[s]uch a power would be
inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary." Id.
41. Id. at 196-97.
42. Id. at 196; but see Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245
(1829) (upholding a Delaware statute authorizing state obstruction of a navigable creek with
[Vol. 18
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Gibbons established that Congress's specifically enumerated powers are
all-expansive and may be exercised for any goal.43 After Gibbons's broad
grant of congressional power, the Commerce Clause enjoyed a quiet ride
with little challenge until after the Civil War.
44
C. Post Civil War Commerce Clause Interpretation (1888-1936)
1. Dual Federalism
With the passing of several influential federal laws, including the
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 4 and the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890,46
the Court entered an era that would involve the development of several new
theories of Commerce Clause construction. "Dual federalism"47 emerged as
a method of determining the federal-state balance of jurisdiction based on
the Tenth Amendment. 4' This compartmentalization of issues to either the
states or Congress is illustrated by the Court's relegation of manufacturing,
mining, and production to the states' control.
49
United States v. E. C. Knight Co.50 illustrates the Court's application of
dual federalism and the specific reservation of issues for the stites. In E.C.
Knight, the Court addressed the Sherman Antitrust Act as it applied to a
large sugar refining company that had acquired four Pennsylvania refineries,
a dam and concluding that the act was within the state's police power and that Congress had
not granted a right to traverse the creek).
43. Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 29, at 909.
44. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 25, at 269. From Chief Justice Marshall's death in
1835 until 1888, few limits were placed on Congress's commerce power. ROTUNDA ET AL.,
supra note 25, at 269. However, Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299
(1851), effected a shift in the Court's style of analysis of Commerce Clause cases.
ARCHIBOLD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 91 (1987). In Cooley, the Court set
forth that if the regulated "subject" was of a national nature or required uniform regulation
it came under Congress's exclusive control, while if the subject required "diversity of
regulation" it was left to the states. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319-20. This decision created
concurrent jurisdiction between the states and Congress, allowing the states to regulate
interstate commerce in the absence of federal regulation. Id. at 319.
45. 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1988)).
46. 24 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ I-I1 (1988)).
47. Dual federalism uses the Tenth Amendment to determine Congress's powers, while
also limiting those powers. ROTUNDA ET AL., supra note 25, at 273. For a further
description of dual federalism's application, see Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual
Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
48. Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 29, at 910.
49. TRIBE, supra note 32, at 308; see, e.g., Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1888)
(concluding that manufacturing was outside Congress's control because it is reserved for local
regulation).
50. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
1996]
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practically assuring itself a nationwide monopoly over the sugar industry."
The Court held that even if this combination were a monopoly over sugar
manufacturing, it did not constitute a monopoly over commerce, regardless
of whether the sugar would soon move through interstate commerce. 2
While reserving manufacturing for state regulation, the Court held this
monopoly had no direct impact on interstate commerce and was therefore
beyond Congress's control.53
In other cases decided during this period, the Court continued to
compartmentalize issues, reserving certain issues for the states and others for
Congress.54 Consistent with E.C. Knight's delegation of manufacturing
regulation to the states, the Court left authority over the interstate movement
of goods produced by child labor to the states. 5" However, the Court
permitted federal laws forbidding the interstate movement of lottery tickets,'
impure foods,57 and stolen automobiles.58 In these cases, the Court
concluded that Congress could exercise its commerce power as long as the
regulated activity or product moved among the states. 9
2. Current of Commerce Theory
Without abandoning E.C. Knight's direct effect analysis, the Court
developed a "current of commerce" theory in Swift & Co. v. United States.60
Swift involved alleged price fixing in cattle stockyard activities conducted
wholly within one state. However, the Court found, because the cattle
merely rested in one state before continuing to a final destination in another
51. Id. at 12.
52. Id. at 17.
53. Id.
54. James M. Maloney, Shootingfor an Omnipotent Congress: The Constitutionality of
Federal Regulation of Intrastate Firearm Possession, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1795, 1806-07
(1994).
55. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) ("The Child Labor Case"), overruled
by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
56. Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) ("The Lottery Case"). Although
reconciling The Child Labor Case with The Lottery Case may appear difficult because both
involved laws regulating the movement of prohibited products between states, Justice Day's
opinion in the former distinguishes the two. Maloney, supra note 54, at 1807. There, the
Court pointed out that the "evil" of child labor was confined to its original location and had
ceased by the time the goods, which were not evil, moved in interstate commerce. Hammer,
247 U.S. at 270-72.
57. Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911).
58. Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
59. See Brooks, 267 U.S. 432; Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. 45; Champion, 188 U.S. 321.
60. 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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state, a current of commerce existed, which justified regulation under
Congress's Commerce Clause power.6'
3. Substantial Economic Effect Test
Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States62 ("The
Shreveport Rate Case") marked an important expansion of Congress's
commerce power.63 In that case, the Court's inquiry into the Commerce
Clause developed still further as it analyzed whether a regulated activity
closely and substantially affected interstate commerce. 64 The Court upheld
the Interstate Commerce Commission's ("ICC") right to regulate railroad
rates between Louisiana and Texas, 65 even though the ICC regulated both
interstate and intrastate shipping operations. 66 This case's relevance was that
the Court allowed the ICC to regulate intrastate rates as long as they had a
close and substantial relation to interstate traffic. 67
D. New Deal Decisions (1933-1936)
Although, early on, Congress exercised its commerce power mainly in
conjunction with transportation between the states, the economic depression
of the early 1930s sparked the demand for federal regulation under President
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal.' During this period, however, the Court
limited Congress's commerce power. In Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,69 the Court refused to grant Congress unlimited power to deal with
the Depression.7 ° Striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act
61. Id. at 399. The Court stated that, because the cattle were "sent for sale from a place
in one [s]tate with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase, in another
[state], .... the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the [s]tates." Id. at
398-99.
62. 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
63. Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv.
1387, 1415 (1987). Epstein provides a detailed analysis of the complicated facts and
implications of The Shreveport Rate Case. See id. at 1415-21.
64. The Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. at 351.
65. Id. at 360.
66. Id. at 352.
67. Id. at 35 1.
68. ROTUNDA, supra note 25, at 285. For an expanded analysis of how the Court dealt
with New Deal legislation, see Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645 (1946) [hereinafter Stem I]; Robert L. Stem,
The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946: Part Two, 59 HARV. L. REv.
883 (1946) [hereinafter Stem II].
69. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
70. Id. at 546. Schechter addressed Congress's enactment of the National Industrial
19961
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("NIRA") as an unauthorized delegation of power to the President7" and an
unauthorized departure from the scope of commerce power, the Court held
that intrastate commerce must affect interstate commerce directly to fall
within Congress's regulation power.72 The NIRA was terminated after
Schechter.73
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,74 the Court continued to enforce
vigorously its view of the Tenth Amendment's limit on federal powers, even
in the face of a national economic crisis. In Carter, the Court held that
federal regulation of miners' hours under the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1935 was beyond Congress's power because mining was production,
and production constituted a purely local activity reserved for local
regulation.75
E. Post-New Deal Interpretation
1. Expansion of Congress's Power: Substantial Economic Effect
and Aggregate Effect Theories
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp."6 marked the Court's abandon-
ment of the "direct versus indirect" distinction77 from Schechter."8
Upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,79 this watershed case
Recovery Act, which granted the President discretion to adopt "codes of fair competition"
in various industries. Id. at 530. The Live Poultry Code was enacted under NIRA to
regulate competition between poultry dealers around New York City. Id. at 521.
71. Id. at 542.
72. Id. at 546. This requirement of a direct effect appears consistent with the "direct
relation to commerce between the states" approach adopted in United States v. E.C. Knight
Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895).
73. Stem I, supra note 68, at 663. Stem argues NIRA sought to cover too much ground
and was "too cumbersome and unworkable." Stem I, supra note 68, at 663. He also states
that the termination of NIRA codes ended federal regulation of industry as a whole, although
industry-specific acts began to emerge soon thereafter. Stem I, supra note 68, at 663-64.
However, these new acts were also subject to Court scrutiny. See, e.g., United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (striking down the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 and stating
that the regulation of the quantity and quality of farm output was reserved for the states).
74. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
75. Id. at 304. The Court recognized that everything that moves in interstate commerce
had to be produced locally. Id. The Court further stated: "Nevertheless, the local character
of mining, of manufacturing and of crop growing is a fact, and remains a fact, whatever may
be done with the products." Id.
76. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
77. Id. at 36-38. Professor Tribe states that the Court abandoned its "formally analytical
approach to the Commerce Clause, and retum[ed] to Chief Justice Marshall's original
empiricism." TRIBE, supra note 32, at 309.
78. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895).
79. 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988)). See also NLRB v. Friedman-
[Vol. 18
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declared that the power to regulate interstate commerce was one of degree,
focusing on the close and substantial impact an activity exerted on interstate
commerce."0 The Court abandoned the distinction between manufacturing
and commerce developed in E.C Knight, as well as Schechter's directness
requirement, focusing instead on how the manufacturer's practices affected
commerce. Additionally, the Court dismissed the current of commerce
theory, deeming it metaphorical.8 2
In United States v. Darby,83 the Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 and overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart's use of the Tenth
Amendment to restrict Congress's commerce power.' The Court relied on
Jones & Laughlin Steel to uphold federal hour and wage regulations on
intrastate labor because the regulated labor propelled products into interstate
commerce.85 Concluding that lower wages affected commerce negatively,
the Court stated that Congress could adopt reasonable means of influencing
commerce between the states, even if doing so meant controlling single state
activities.86
Many scholars believe that Wickard v. Filburn8 7 was the Court's most
sweeping application of commerce power to intrastate transactions.88 In a
unanimous decision, the Wickard Court upheld the application of the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 ("AAA") to Roscoe Filburn, owner of
a small Ohio farm. 9
Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937) (upholding application of NLRA to a small
clothing manufacturer).
80. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37. The case involved the National Labor
Relations Board's attempt to keep Jones & Laughlin, the fourth largest steel producer in the
United States, from engaging in unfair labor practices, including firing employees because
of their union involvement. Id. at 26-29.
81. Id. at 36-38. The Court stated that Congress may regulate intrastate activities with
"such a close and substantial relation to commerce that their control is essential . . . to
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions." Id. at 37.
82. Id. at 36.
83. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
84. Id. at 116-17. The Court found that Hammer was a "departure from the principles
which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause." Id. at 116.
85. Id. at 119-20.
86. Id. at 120-21. The Court held that Congress "may choose the means reasonably
adapted to the attainment of the permitted end, even though they involve control of intrastate
activities." Id. at 121.
87. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
88. Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, 15 ARIZ. L. REv. 271, 275 n.29 (1973).
89. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29. One of the purposes of the AAA was to stabilize the
market price of wheat by controlling the volume produced. Id. at 115. In the 1920s, the
United States exported more than one-quarter of its wheat. Stern 11, supra note 68, at 901.
The demand for wheat exports decreased sharply after foreign nations began producing more
of their own wheat. Stem II, supra note 68, at 901. Subsequently, the price of wheat
1996]
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Filbum's operations consisted of maintaining dairy cattle and poultry
and selling the products thereof.90  However, Filburn also produced
approximately twenty-three acres of wheat, which exceeded his eleven-acre
allotment under the AAA.9' The Court stated that Congress's commerce
power should not be analyzed within the constraints of any formula such as
classifying activities as production.92 Furthermore, the Court stated that,
even if Filburn's wheat production was deemed local and did not amount to
commerce, Congress could regulate such production if it had a substantial
economic effect on commerce. 93 In arriving at its conclusion, the Court
expressly repudiated the "direct versus indirect" effects test.94
Wickard established that Congress may regulate small, truly local
activities if many similar activities aggregated together would have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.95 In Jones & Laughlin Steel and
Wickard, the Court responded to the early twentieth century development of
industry and fueled the destruction of geographical boundaries by generously
enlarging Commerce Clause power.96
2. The Civil Rights Cases-The 1960s
Utilizing its commerce power,97 Congress enacted Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 to provide injunctive relief against discrimination in
places of public accommodation." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
plummeted from one dollar per bushel in 1929 to thirty-eight cents in 1932. Stem II, supra
note 68, at 901.
90. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114.
91. Id. Besides selling a portion, Filburn mostly used his wheat for personal purposes,
such as feeding his cattle and poultry, making flour for home consumption, and reseeding
his field. Id.
92. Id. at 120.
93. Id. at 125.
94. Id.
95. Stem II, supra note 68, at 909 ("[T]he opinion makes it plain that Congress may
control all the necessarily interrelated operations of an interstate industry, no matter how
'local' particular transactions may appear . . . when viewed in isolation.").
96. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1628 (1995).
97. Maloney, supra note 54, at 1812. Congress decided to rely on the Commerce
Clause for authority, rather than on the Fourteenth Amendment because the latter's "inability
to reach private action was perceived as a disadvantage." Maloney, supra note 54, at 1812.
98. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C §§
2000a-2000b (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
99. Places of public accommodation include, among others, places of lodging,
restaurants, gas stations, and places of entertainment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992).
[Vol. 18 *
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States" and Katzenbach v. McClungl°' were the two principle cases that
addressed whether Congress could regulate such activities under the
Commerce Clause. The Court upheld Title II in both, granting Congress
practically limitless power to regulate activity under its commerce power. 2
Relying on pre-Civil Rights Act congressional hearings, the Court, in
Heart of Atlanta Motel, concluded that Congress had a rational basis for
exercising its commerce power. These hearings found that African-
Americans had difficulty finding lodging while traveling0 3 and that
discrimination in lodging discouraged and decreased African-American
travel between the states."° Likewise, in McClung, the Court upheld Title
II of the Civil Rights Act, relying on congressional hearings that stated
African-Americans spent less money in discriminating restaurants and
theaters.0 5 This trend of peering into congressional hearings and legislative
history to determine whether Congress had a rational basis for utilizing its
commerce power continued after these cases."°
3. Federal Criminal Law-The 1970s
Before 1971, the Court had limited its use of the "affecting commerce"
test by requiring a nexus to interstate commerce for offenses prosecuted
under commerce-based federal criminal laws. 107 However, in Perez v.
United States,0 8 the Court upheld a conviction under Title 1I of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act ("CCPA"),0 9 a federal loan-sharking
statute, 10 without any demonstration of a specific interstate nexus.1 ' The
100. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
101. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
102. See Cirillo & Eisenhofer, supra note 29, at 914-15.
103. Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53 (citing S. REP. No. 872, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. 14-22 (1964)).
104. Id. (citing Hearings Before Senate Comm. on Commerce S. 1732, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 744 (1963)).
105. McClung, 379 U.S. at 299.
106. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (relying on formal congressional
findings); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
(relying on formal congressional findings); but see Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1971) (not requiring formal congressional findings to uphold statute).
107. Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good: Assessing Federalization of
Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REv. 455, 460 (1994).
108. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
109. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 159 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896.
(1964)).
110. The CCPA made it a federal crime to charge excessive interest on loans, or to
collect debts by violence or threats of violence, but did not require any specific connection
to interstate commerce. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 159 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 891(7) (1964)). However, Title 11 of the CCPA did include congressional findings that
1996]
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Court concluded that extortionate credit transactions, when aggregated, affect
interstate commerce.' 
2
Perez was found guilty of using threats to collect money owed him
by a local New York butcher." 3 Acknowledging that the threats, taken
alone, failed to impact interstate commerce, the Court decided Congress had
concluded reasonably that loan sharking's proceeds could be used to finance
interstate crime and thus affected interstate commerce." 4 With this decision
the Court appeared to concede it would defer to Congress's judgment in
using its commerce power.
After Perez, the federalization of criminal laws increased,"' including
laws proscribing arson,' 16 carjacking," 7 and access to abortion clinics."'
With Congress's increased political appetite for the federalization of crimes,
the federal court case backlog increased."9 Nonetheless, Congress's right
to enact laws regulating activities that, when aggregated, are rationally
determined to affect interstate commerce was established in the cases from
Wickard to Perez.
IV. REASONING OF THE LOPEZ COURT
A. Majority Opinion
In a five-to-four decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
started its analysis by providing a thorough history of the Commerce Clause,
mapping the evolution of judicial interpretation of Congress's commerce
power. 20 The Court then analyzed the constitutionality of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, concluding the Act does not substantially affect
interstate commerce.' 2'
connected extortionate credit practices to interstate commerce. Perez, 402 U.S. at 147 n.1.
11. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 148.
114. Id. at 154.
115. For several views of the trend toward an increasing number of federal crimes, see
Chippendale, supra note 107, at 455-58; Rachel J. Littman, Comment, Gun-Free Schools:
Constitutional Powers, Limitations and Social Policy, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 723 (1995).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (Supp. 1995).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. 1995). This statute imposes liability on anyone who "with
the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been
transported, shipped, or received in interstate ... commerce from the person or presence of
another by force and violence or by intimidation ..... Id.
118. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (Supp. 1995).
119. Chippendale, supra note 107, at 471.
120. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1627-30 (1995).
121. Id. at 1630-34.
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The Court stated that Congress's commerce power may exist under
three wide areas.'22 First, Congress may exercise power over channels of
interstate commerce.123 Second, Congress may control the instrumentalities
of commerce between states, or persons or things in it.' 24 Third, Congress
may regulate transactions that substantially affect interstate commerce. 25
The Court conceded that case law was not clear regarding whether an
activity must "affect" or "substantially affect" interstate commerce to fall
under the commerce power. 26 However, the Court concluded the weight of
case law demands that the controlled activity "substantially affect" interstate
commerce.1
27
With regard to Lopez, the Court dismissed the first two categories of
commerce Congress may regulate, stating that the regulation of guns in
school zones is not a regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of
commerce. 128 Therefore, to uphold the Act's constitutionality, the Court
would have to find that the proscribed activity substantially affected
interstate commerce.
29
1. Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
The Court then analyzed the substantial impact of an economic activity.
After enumerating the Court's upholding the regulation of coal mining, loan
sharking, restaurants using interstate supplies, and hotels frequented by
interstate guests, the majority revisited the Wickard case. 30 The Court used
the facts from Wickard to describe the rationale behind the aggregate effects
test. 1'
The Court then noted that the Act is a criminal law, 132 an area
traditionally regulated by the states. 133 Additionally, the Court found that
122. Id. at 1629 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276-77 (1981)).
123. Id. (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941)).
124. Id. (citing Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)).
125. Id. at 1329-30 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)).
126. Id. at 1630.
127. Id. (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled by National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)). In Wirtz, the Court stated it had never declared
that Congress "may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad
general regulation of state or private activities." Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 196 n.27.
128. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
129. Id.
130. Id. Because the facts and reasoning of these cases were described in Part III, the
Court's analysis of these cases will not be presented again.
131. Id. (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
132. Id. at 1630-31.
133. Id. at 1631 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993)
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the regulation of firearm possession around schools did not address
commerce, nor did it fall within a larger economic regulatory scheme.
34
The Court recognized that Congress could regulate an intrastate activity that
in the aggregate imparted a substantial impact on interstate commerce. 35
However, the Court concluded that section 922(q) did not regulate economic
activity and that the Act, when viewed in the aggregate, did not substantially
affect interstate commerce.1
36
2. Jurisdictional Issue
For a federal criminal law to pass Commerce Clause muster, the
regulated activity must contain an identifiable connection with interstate
commerce.33 The Court concluded that the Act contained no provision for
determining whether any specific breach truly impacts commerce between
multiple states.
131
In United States v. Bass, 39 the Court addressed a federal statute making
it a crime for a felon to receive, possess, or transport a firearm."4 The Bass
Court interpreted the vague statute as requiring an identifiable connection to
interstate commerce in addition to mere proof of gun possession.'
In Lopez, the Government admitted the statute and its legislative history
omitted any congressional findings regarding the interstate commerce effect
of taking a gun to school.'42 Agreeing that formal findings are not
mandatory to uphold a law, 43 the Court stated it could discern no apparent
("States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law."); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) ("Mhe administration of criminal justice rests with
the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of [its] delegated powers, has created
offenses against the United States.")).
134. Id. at 1631.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
138. Id.
139. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
140. Id. at 337.
141. Id. at 347.
142. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631 (quoting Brief for the United States, Lopez, at 5-6 (No.
93-1260)). In a footnote, the Court acknowledged the Act was amended by the Violent
Crime and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. Id. at 1632 n.4.
Section 320904 amends § 922(q) of the Gun-Free School Zone Act by including
congressional findings regarding the interstate commerce effects of school zone firearm
possession. Id. The Court noted the Government did not rely on these findings in Lopez;
additionally, the Court did not rely on or repudiate these findings in its analysis. Id.
143. Id. (citing Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146 (1971)).
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substantial interstate commerce effects on the statute's face.' Although
Congress produced findings regarding the effects of firearms, none of these
findings addressed the Commerce Clause issues of the Act.'45 While the
Government argued Congress had accumulated insight into the effects of
firearm regulation when passing prior laws, the Court rejected this
justification of the Act. 14 6
The Government asserted two further arguments that the Act did
substantially affect interstate commerce. 47 First, the Government argued
that allowing guns in schools would propagate violent crime, which, in turn,
would harm the national economy through increased costs 148 and diminished
travel to crime-ridden areas. 49 Second, the Government contended that guns
at schools threaten the learning environment, 50 which will manifest itself in
the form of a less productive populace, consequently injuring national
economic performance.' 5' The Court rejected both the cost and productivity
arguments, implying that the Government's logic, if strictly followed, would
create a vast, almost limitless, congressional commerce power.'52
The Court then critiqued Justice Breyer's dissent, finding that his
enumerated limits on the commerce power conflicted with the dissent's
otherwise broad approach.'53 The Court further questioned Congress's
intervention in other school issues, such as curriculum.'54 After rebuffing
the dissent's overly broad classification of schools as commercial activities,
the Court acknowledged that legal uncertainties will exist as long as the
judicial branch interprets the limits on Congress's Commerce Clause
144. Id. at 1632. The Court stated that congressional findings would have aided in the
evaluation of "legislative judgment" and whether the regulated activity "substantially affected
interstate commerce." Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing Brief for the United States, Lopez, at 17 (No. 93-1260)).
148. Id. (citing United States v. Evans, 928 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1991)). The
Government argued that insurance costs would escalate for everyone. Id.
149. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. ("[I]f we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.").
153. Id. at 1633. The Court noted Justice Breyer's connection between interstate
commerce and the proscribed conduct but found it unpersuasive. Id. His constitutional
nexus was that gun-related violence is a serious problem that adversely affects learning,
which subsequently threatens commerce. Id.
154. Id. The Court noted that, under Justice Breyer's approach, if Congress determined
that curriculum had a significant effect on learning, it could mandate federal curriculum for
elementary and secondary schools. Id.
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powers.1" However, the Court explained that such uncertainties are inherent
in a system of enumerated powers.
156
3. Majority's Conclusion
Acknowledging that no exact formula exists for analyzing Commerce
Clause questions, the Court concluded that the possession of a gun in a
school zone did not constitute an economic activity that would substantially
affect interstate commerce. 57  Lopez was a local student, and nothing
indicated he had conducted interstate activities."' Additionally, the Act
contained no requirement of a nexus with interstate commerce.1
59
The Court further stated that upholding Congress's passage of the Act
could amount to the granting of a general police power normally reserved
for the States."6 Conceding that prior cases hinted at a possible enlargement
of Congress's power, the Court refused to do so.' 6' The Court concluded
by expressing the importance of maintaining a separation between national
and local powers and thus affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision.
162
B. Concurring Opinions
Justice Kennedy joined the majority, but clarified his reasons for
striking down the Act. 163 He concluded that upholding the Act would
interfere with states' judgment in an area they are capable of regulating. 164
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas disagreed with the "substantial effects"
test, stating that commerce should be viewed more narrowly.' 65 Asserting
that, over the years, the Court has departed from the Constitution and early
case law, he emphasized that the federal government's powers are enumer-
ated and should not be conferred sweepingly, as under the substantial effects
test. 1
66
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1634.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
163. See id. at 1634-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
164. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
165. See id. at 1642-51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
166. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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C. Dissenting Opinions
In the shortest of the three dissents, Justice Stevens stated Congress
should have the power to regulate gun possession at any location and that
the Court's previous cases reflect a respect for Congress's judgment. 67 In
his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter criticized the majority for not
concluding Congress had a rational basis for deciding that school zone
firearm possession affects interstate commerce.
168
Finally, in the longest dissent, Justice Breyer argued the Act was within
the commerce power's scope as defined by the Court for the past six
decades.169 He argued that the Court must look at the cumulative effect of
regulated acts and must grant Congress leeway under the substantial effects
test. 7° He further pointed out three problems in the majority's conclusion.
First, he claimed the majority's opinion conflicted with modem cases
upholding laws with more tenuous interstate commerce connections.'
71
Next, he opined that distinguishing between the regulation of commercial
versus noncommercial activities was flawed. 72  Finally, he argued the
decision created uncertainty in an area that, until now, had seemed
reasonably settled. '
71
V. SIGNIFICANCE
Views on the practical significance of Lopez vary widely. Senator Herb
Kohl, Wisconsin Democrat and sponsor of the rejected provision of the Act,
called the Court's decision legal "nitpicking,"'' 4 while J.B. Richeson,
president of the San Antonio Teacher's Council, stated the decision will
mean very little because Texas state law still prohibits firearm possession at
schools. 75 While few would argue against gun prohibition in schools, the
real issue appears to be jurisdiction-whether the states or Congress should
regulate firearm possession in school zones. 176
167. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. See id. at 1656-57 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1662-63 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1663-64 (Breyer, J, dissenting).
173. Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
174. Holly Idelson, Supreme Court: High Court Strikes Down Law Banning Guns Near
Schools, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., May 11, 1995, at 1181.
175. Dan Calderon, Education Observers in S.A. See Little Effect, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Apr. 27, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 5559115, at *1.
176. Forty-three states currently have laws similar to the Act. The seven states that do
not are Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Montana, New Hampshire, and Wyoming. Charles
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In his radio address two days after the Lopez decision, President
Clinton reacted strongly against Lopez, stating he would find a way to ban
firearms in or near schools.'7 7 Furthermore, the President presented
Congress with the Gun-Free School Zones Amendments Act of 1995, which
adds a requirement that the government prove the firearm moved in or
otherwise affects interstate commerce.'78 While the amendment, if passed,
appears to solve the jurisdictional requirement, it remains to be seen whether
Lopez creates a new commerce power limit that prevents Congress from
reaching noncommercial activities in the regulation of interstate
commerce.
79
Beyond the practical significance regarding the Act's constitutionality,
the decision could have lasting implications on Congress's commerce power
and federalism in general. 80 With Lopez, the Court raised several questions
that could call other federal statutes into question. First, Lopez raises the
question as to whether the Court has implied that Congress may only
regulate "commercial" activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.' The Court did not clarify whether it will allow Congress to
regulate noncommercial activities to protect interstate commerce. 2
Lopez also raises the issue of the quantity of legislative history and
congressional findings required for the Court to conclude that Congress had
a rational basis for determining whether the regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce. 8 3  Additionally, the Court did not specify
whether this new reluctance to defer to Congress's judgment will only apply
to criminal laws or laws controlling noncommercial activities.
J. Russo, United States v. Lopez and the Demise of the Gun-Free School Zones Act:
Legislative Over-Reaching or Judicial Nit-Picking?, 99 Ed. L. Rep. 11, June 1995, available
in WESTLAW, 99 WELR Ii, at *7 n.70 (citing High Court Derails Federal Anti-Gun Law,
SCH. L. NEWS, May 5, 1995, at 1, 3).
177. The President's Radio Address, April 29, 1995, WKLY. COMPILATION OF
PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, May 8, 1995, at 735-36.
178. Message to Congress Transmitting the "Gun-Free School Zones Amendments Act
of 1995," WKLY. COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, May 15, 1995, at 809-10.
179. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1633 (1995).
180. Russo, supra note 176, at *7.
181. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633. The Court acknowledged that whether an activity is
commercial may create "legal uncertainty," but such uncertainty is a part of our legal system.
Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1632. The Court refused to rely on Congress's previous findings that failed
to address directly § 922(q). Id. Furthermore, the Court rejected the Government's argument
that Congress possessed "accumulated institutional expertise" regarding the regulation of
firearms. Id.
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In United States v. Robertson,"s the Court upheld the application of
the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) to a
business-related crime occurring primarily within one state."' This case
may establish that the Court is not determined to expand Lopez and curtail
Congress's commerce power. Nonetheless, Lopez may demonstrate that the
determination of what is "commercial" is within the hands of the Court, not
Congress.
18 6
While the Court's more conservative justices appear to reflect the
growing national clamor to divest the national government of power, both
of President Clinton's nominees, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented. 8 7
This should prove very significant as future bench nominees could invite
vigorous debate as to whether the Court should assume an activist role in
reflecting current political climates.'
Without a doubt, Congress's commerce power is limited by the
Supreme Court's interpretation. In United States v. Lopez, without formally
abandoning any of the existing commerce clause theories such as the
substantial effects or aggregate effect tests, the Court reserved the issue of
school-zone gun possession for the states.8 9 Whether or not the Court was
evading a trend toward a national police power and returning to a clear-cut
dual federalism approach to the commerce clause or simply analyzing one
statute's effect on interstate commerce remains to be seen.
John M Scott
184. 115 S. Ct. 1732 (1995).
185. Id. at 1733.
186. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633 ("We do not doubt that Congress has authority under
the Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities .... That authority,
though broad, does not include the authority to regulate each and every aspect of local
schools.").
187. Russo, supra note 176, at *7.
188. Russo, supra note 176, at *7.
189. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.
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